Abstract Flow and congestion control allow the users of a telecommunication network to regulate the tra c they send into the network in accordance with the quality of service they require. Flow control may be performed by the network, as is the case in ATM networks (the Available Bit Rate transfer capacity), or by the users themselves, as is the case in the Internet (TCP/IP). We study in this paper both situations using optimal control and dynamic game techniques. The rst situation leads to the formulation of a dynamic team problem, while the second one leads to a dynamic noncooperative game, for which we establish the existence and uniqueness of a linear Nash equilibrium, and obtain a characterization of the corresponding equilibrium policies along with the performance costs. We further show that when the users update their policies in a greedy manner, not knowing a priori the utilities of the other players, the sequence of policies thus generated converges to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we study an extension of the model that accommodates multiple tra c types for each user, with the switching from one type of tra c to another being governed by a Markov jump process. Presentation of some numerical results complements this study.
I. Introduction
We consider M users that share a common bottleneck queue in a telecommunications network. The input ow of information from the users is controlled so as to achieve the best quality of service. As is the case in many proposed ow-control schemes 2], 16], we assume that there is some target value of the queue length which the users try to track; this value and the control policies are chosen on the one hand to avoid the bu er to be full (in order to minimize Paper approved by A. Pattavina, the Editor for Switching Architecture Performance of the IEEE Communications Society. Manuscript received November 6, 1996 ; revised October 8, 1997 . A shorter version was presented at the 36th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, San Diego, California, Dec. 1997.
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Tamer Ba ar is with the Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1308 West Main Street, Urbana, IL 61801/USA. Tel: (217) 3333607; Fax: (217) 2441653. His research was supported in part by NSF Grants ECS 92-20632, ECS 93-12807, and in part by the AFOSR MURI Grant AF-DC-5-36128. losses), and on the other, to avoid the queue to empty, which would lead to loss in the potential throughput. A second objective of each user is related to the input rate: we assume that some fraction of the available bandwidth is allocated to each user, and the user tries to minimize deviation from this allocated bandwidth.
Flow control is typically performed dynamically: some feedback information on the congestion or on round trip delay is used to update the input rate. For example, in the Tahoe version of TCP/IP congestion control 19], congestion is detected through losses or through time-out mechanisms. In the Vegas version of TCP/IP 11], the available bandwidth is also used as feedback information (it is obtained through estimation of round-trip delays). More detailed queue length information may also be available as feedback information. In the Available Bit Rate (ABR) transfer capacity of ATM, both queue length information as well as information on the rate may be conveyed from the switches to the sources through special information cells that are called RM (Resource Management) cells.
Flow control is often performed in a decentralized way in telecommunication networks: each user controls its own ow. This is the case in the Internet, see 19] , or in some best-e ort type tra c in ATM (the Unspeci ed Bit Rate transfer capacity, see 1] ). This gives rise to a noncooperative dynamic game: each user has its own objectives, but the actions of the di erent users in uence the quality of service of other users. Controllers that have been implemented in large scale, such as the TCP/IP, have heretofore typically been designed using heuristic techniques based on growing experience (and on simulation studies) and have not involved a game-theoretic analysis.
On the other hand, there has been some work on the use of noncooperative game theoretical techniques to design simple ow controls. The problem of choosing xed (nonstate dependent) rates has been investigated in 10 22] . Another type of a noncooperative ow control occurs when a central controller seeks a globally optimal performance measure which is a function of utilities declared by the users. The true utilities of the users are, however, private information, and the declared utilities may not coincide with the true ones. In that case, the game aspect of the problem arises in the revealing policy of the utilities. The design of a (non-state dependent) ow control that induces a truthful revealing policy for all users has been obtained in 13 In this paper we study state-dependent decentralized control and game problems. For both the noncooperative problem (that occurs when the controls are at end-points) as well as the team problem (occurring when the controllers are at the switches), we obtain explicitly the unique optimal (or equilibrium) controllers and the associated values. We then study asynchronous and synchronous update algorithms that the users might implement in order to compute their policies on line, since in practice, a user may not have access to full information on the utilities of other users, and thus, may not be able to construct its own Nash equilibrium solution o line. Instead, it is natural to assume that such a user would follow a greedy approach of optimizing from time to time its response against the current policies of other users. We present four such algorithms, establish convergence properties for two of them, and present numerical results illustrating convergence as well as its rate for three of the algorithms.
The balance of the paper has been organized as follows. In the next section we introduce and motivate the basic mathematical model, and obtain characterizations of equilibrium policies under both team and noncooperative game scenarios. We then introduce, in Section III, four algorithms for on line computation of Nash equilibria, and present some convergence analysis. Section IV deals with an extension of the basic model to the case where users have di erent tra c types, with switching from one type to another governed by a Markov jump process. For this case, we obtain the linear Nash equilibrium. Section V is devoted to presentation of some numerical results, and Section VI to a discussion on the asymptotic behavior of various solutions as the number of users grow, and comparisons between the Nash and the team solutions. The paper ends with the concluding remarks of Section VII.
II. The model and basic existence and uniqueness results
The basic model we work with in this paper is based on three simplifying (but realistic) assumptions:
1. Fluid approximation. We replace a discrete number of packets by a continuous uid. The uid approximation is justi ed by the fact that in today's technology, bu ering capabilities are very large (several thousands) in terms of the number of packets that they can store, so that the error of replacing an integer number of packets by a real number is small relative to the size of bu ers. This type of approximation is common both in the design of controllers in high-speed telecommunication networks (see e.g. 8]) as well as in performance evaluation of existing controllers 27], 29].
2. Linearized dynamics. It is assumed that the network has linearized dynamics for the control of queue length; see (1) below. This means in particular that we neglect losses when the bu er is full, and we neglect the boundary e ect of an empty queue. To motivate this linearization, we use the fact that the controllers that we derive operate in a region close to = 1 (full throughput utilization), so that the queue will almost never empty. Operating at = 1 is common in the control of ABR switches, see e.g., 20]. The full utilization ( = 1) is possible by regulating the (controlled) input rate and adapting it to the available capacity. As discussed below, we set some desirable threshold on the queue length which we attempt to track, precisely so as to avoid large queues (which might result in losses) or empty queues (which might result in loss of potential throughput). When a control mechanism has a full utilization, then the nonlinearity around zero disappears. For similar models with a single controller, simulations have con rmed 3], 2] that controlled linearized models lead to trajectories that are very close to the original one. The fact that the other boundary is ignored is motivated by similar arguments, since our optimal control will be shown to be symmetric with respect to positive or negative deviations around the target queue value.
3. Bottleneck assumption. We assume that all performance measures (such as throughput, delays, loss probabilities, etc.) are determined essentially by a bottleneck node. This assumption admits theoretical as well as experimental justi cations; see 7] .
We now introduce the model we adopt in this paper. Let q(t) denote the queue length at a bottleneck link, and s(t)
denote the total e ective service rate available at that link. Assume that each user is assigned a x proportion of the available bandwidth; more speci cally, the tra c of source m at that link at time t has an available bandwidth of a m s(t). 
which is idealized because the end-point e ects have been ignored. The objectives of the ow controllers are (i) to ensure that the bottleneck queue size stays around some desired level Q, and (ii) to achieve good tracking between input and output rates. In particular, the choice of Q and the variability around it have a direct impact on loss probabilities and throughput. We therefore de ne a shifted version of q: x(t) := q(t) ? Q, in view of which (1) now
An appropriate local cost function that is compatible with the objectives stated above would be the one that penalizes variations in x(t) and u m (t) around zero a candidate for which is the weighted quadratic cost function. Associated with user m is a positive constant c m appearing in its immediate cost, as described below. We shall rst consider two noncooperative scenarios, formulated as noncooperative di erential games, in which each user minimizes its own individual cost function. Then we shall study two cooperative scenarios, formulated as team control problems, in which all users have the same (common) objective.
We x an initial state x(0), and assume that the actions of controller m (m 2 M) are determined by a control policy m 2 U m , where u m (t) = m (t; x 0;t] ), t 2 0; 1). Here, m is taken to be piecewise continuous in its rst argument, and piecewise Lipschitz continuous in its second argument.
We denote the class of all such policies for user m by U m .
It will soon turn out that it will be su cient to restrict attention to a subclass of U m , comprising policies that are linear in the current value of x; by an abuse of notation, we will denote such policies also by m , i.e., u m (t) = m (x(t)). (4) Note that in case N2 the e ort for keeping the deviations of the queue length from the desired value is split equally between the users.
The solution concept we adopt for N1 and N2 is the Nash equilibrium: We seek a multi-policy := ( Proof: We prove the result only for N1; its counterpart N2 can be proven similarly. Also for ease of notation, we drop all superscripts pertaining to the case considered. We rst choose a candidate solution of the form (8) (9)- (10) ( (10) is obtained by summing (9) over m 2 M). The fact that (10) admits a unique solution follows from the fact that the left-hand side minus the right-hand side of (10) Proof: We again consider only N1; the result for N2 then follows from (11) . Furthermore, as before we drop the superscripts identifying the two cases. Assume that (15) holds. Then, (9) can be written as: 
A solution of (17) (and thus of (10)) is
Since, by Theorem 1, the solution of (10) 
III. Greedy decentralized algorithms
Although the Nash equilibrium is a natural solution concept for the noncooperative decentralized control problem formulated here, its computation might yet require some coordination (and thus centralization and cooperation) between the users since it involves the individual utilities of all players, as captured by the constants c m ; m 2 M. In practice, however, these utilities are typically private information, and communicating these might result in unacceptable additional complexity. It is thus natural to investigate whether simple greedy best response algorithms could be used for updating the users' control policies in a decentralized way, thus avoiding the need for communication, coordination, and computation of the Nash equilibrium. We show in this section that this is indeed the case, and moreover, sequences generated by two such algorithms converge to the Nash equilibrium.
A general greedy best response algorithm is de ned by the following four conditions 6]: (i) Each user updates from time to time its policy by computing the best response against the most recently announced policies of the other users.
(ii) The time between updates is su ciently large, so that the control problem faced by a user when it updates its policy is well approximated by the original in nite horizon problem.
(iii) The order of updates could be arbitrary, but each user performs updates in nitely often.
(iv) When the nth update occurs, a subset K n f1; : : : ; Mg of users simultaneously update their policies.
Hence, assuming that an initial set of policies is linear, a
where f m is as de ned in (14) . What distinguishes one particular algorithm from another one is the choice of the set K n . We identify here four such choices:
1. Parallel Update Algorithm (PUA): K n = f1; :::; Mg =: M for all n. 2. Round Robin Algorithm (RRA): K n is a singleton for all n and equals (n + k)modM + 1, where k is an arbitrary positive integer.
3. Random Polling Algorithm (RPA): K n = f n g, where n , n 1, is an independent discrete random process, where for each xed n, the random variable n takes values in M, with every possible outcome (1; :::; M) having positive probability, uniformly bounded away from zero. Hence, here only one user acts at every update time, and this user is picked according to the outcome of a chance mechanism.
Stochastic Asynchronous Algorithm (SAA):
K n = n , where n , n 1, is an independent set-valued random process, where for each xed n, the random quantity n takes values in the set of all subsets of M, with the property that every player is in an outcome with positive probability, uniformly bounded away from zero. Hence, here more than one user is allowed to act at every update time, but the users (as well as their number) are picked randomly.
We present a numerical analysis of the rst three of these algorithms in Section V. Below we study the convergence of PUA and RRA. by induction, we get for all integers n and for all k :
Combining (24) with (25) (ii.a) Let M = 2, and assume rst that (1) k = 0, k = 1; 2. Then it follows that both (^ 1 ;~ 2 ) as well as (~ 1 ;^ 2 ) (dened in the rst part of the Theorem) are in Nash equilibrium (since for any integer n, (n+1) 1 is the optimal response against (n) 2 and (n+1) 2 is the optimal response against (n) 1 ). Since the Nash equilibrium is unique, we have~ =^ 2 . The proof of (ii.a) (for nonzero initial conditions as well) now follows from part (i.b) of the Theorem. is an M-dimensional vector whose kth component is ( ) k . Using (14) and (22) Remark 2: (Rate of convergence) Numerical experimentation has shown that PUA has a slow rate of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. To illustrate this (analytically), consider the symmetric case, where c m = 1 for all players, and the initial (1) m are the same. Combining (26) , (27) and (28) . In order to establish the asymptotic stability of the linearized system it su ces to show that the eigenvalues of (I ?C) ? 
IV. Multi-type traffic
We consider in this section the following extension of the model described in Section II. As before, each user has to control its own transmission rate; however, the type of tra c to be transmitted is not xed anymore. Di erent tra c classes may correspond to di erent applications that may have di erent performance requirements. The state of the system, which determines the dynamics and upon which users base their control decisions, will now include not only the queue length, but also the tra c types. Each user transmits just one tra c type at a time.
To make this precise, we now introduce some notation Consider now a constrained version of the game in which player k is restricted to use k (i) 2 0; B k (i)], where B k (i) is an arbitrary constant larger than the bound c k (i)= min j p c k (j). Since the cost of a typical player k in this constrained game is strictly convex in the policy of that player, and since the policy space is now compact and convex, there exists a Nash equilibrium by a standard existence result for static games (see 6], Theorem 4.3, p.179). This turns out to be, however, an equilibrium in the unconstrained game as well, because as shown above, the unique response of any player to any set of policies of the other players picked as in (30) is also of the form (30) , satisfying the bound (33). Hence, this establishes the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the form (30) for the original game, which satis es (31) and (32).
V. Numerical results
We present in this section results of a numerical study on the behavior of the rst three greedy decentralized algorithms presented in Section III. As pointed out in Remark 2, the rate of convergence of PUA becomes slower as the number of users become large. We have therefore tested the convergence of the algorithms for two cases: M moderate (M = 4) and M relatively large (M = 10). We have focused on the symmetric case c m = 1, for all m, and started the iterations with zero initial conditions. All three algorithms converged. respectively. In both gures we have focused on user number 1, and have computed its after each cycle, i.e., each time all users have updated their policies. The PUA is seen to converge quite slowly: it takes around 40 cycles for convergence, and it takes longer as the number of users grow. The RRA converges almost instantaneously to the Nash equilibrium. Figures 3 and 4 pertain to RPA for 4 and 10 users, respectively. The user that updates at a given iteration is chosen with equal probabilities, and the choices are independent. Thus, the time between updates of user m are geometrically distributed with parameter 1=M. Figure 3 depicts the behavior of each of the users, whereas Figure 4 depicts the behavior of only players 1,3,5,7,9. The basic unit of the x axis is one iteration. We can see that there are iterations where no update occurs: this happens when the random mechanism picks the same user at two consecutive iterations. The rate of convergence is seen to be faster than PUA and slower than RRA.
VI. Asymptotic behavior and comparisons
We present, in this section, some observations on the asymptotic behaviors of the various solutions obtained, as the number of users grow, as well as the relative rates of convergence of the proposed algorithms all for the singletype tra c. A problem that may arise due to this situation is that the users might choose non-optimal policies, which might cause an overall ine cient use of the network (for example, large variations of the sum of u m 's) and still have a correspondingly low cost. A way to circumvent this situation is to choose a network pricing policy that does not satisfy (A1) and hence (A2). In other words, the individual costs 1=c m may be chosen by the network according to the expected number of users; if the network is designed for a large number of users then the c m should be smaller than those used in pricing in a network with a smaller expected number of users.
The situation is di erent, however, in the noncooperative case: the total cost (summing over all users) need not go This again may result in the problems discussed above for the team case, but a way to circumvent this situation is again to choose a network pricing policy for which c does not grow linearly in M. For example, if we choose c to be constant in M then the value per user in case N1 will tend to a constant as M goes to in nity. For the case N2, c has to be chosen to be decreasing (like 1=M) in order to achieve this same behavior of the value.
Comparing values and gains in T1,T2, N1,N2
We rst note that the optimum (equilibrium) costs in cases T1 and N1 are, as can be expected, larger than those in the corresponding cases T2 and N2, with the multiplicative factor being A comparison of the control gains ( ) in the symmetric team and Nash equilibrium solutions also reveal a consistent pattern, but this time in the opposite direction. Team control gains are now higher in both cases, by the same factor: p 2M ? 1.
VII. Concluding Remarks
We have presented a fairly simple model of a communication network where users control their individual rates of transmission. This has led to very simple and appealing transmission policies under both team and noncooperative dynamic game scenarios, and has allowed us to prove powerful existence, uniqueness and convergence results in the latter case, which are reported for the rst time in the literature. The simplicity of the model adopted has, inescapably, also led to some limitations in the direct application of these results to real communication networks. These limitations are:
(i) We have not taken into account delays, and the presence of noise in the information available to the users; taking these into account would have required incorporation into the model some stochasticity assumptions on the uctuations of the available bandwidth (or consideration of robust controller design). First steps in this directions have been taken in 3] for the case of a single controller, and in 4] for a team situation (where only a suboptimal control policy has been derived). Another feature that was ignored here is the fact that information might not be available continuously, but only at some sampling instants (such as the arrival of RM cells to a source), unless the control is performed by the bottleneck switch.
(ii) We have not taken into account here constraints such as PCR (peak cell rate) and MCR (minimum cell rate). The latter is a feature that can be o ered in the ABR service 1], although it does not exist on the internet. When considering saturated sources, one can ignore the MCR and apply the analysis of this paper only to the part that exceeds it.
(iii) As explained at the beginning of Section II, we have ignored the nonlinearities in the dynamics due to the boundary e ects (empty or full bu er). We have further used a uid model approximation, and have restricted the analysis to a simple bottleneck node.
Incorporating all these features into the model would lead to a much more complicated model and naturally to more complex control policies. Nevertheless, this is a direction worth pursuing, under the guidance of the results presented in this paper. e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 
